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This	 article	 examines	 the	 circumstances	 in	 which	 the	 old	 ships	 and	 craft	 of	 the	
post-1945	Royal	Navy’s	Amphibious	Warfare	Squadron	were	 replaced	by	 the	new	
assault	ships	HMS	Fearless	and	Intrepid.	It	analyses	the	impact	on	the	requirement	
for	amphibious	 forces	of	 the	change	 in	emphasis	 in	 the	 late	1950s	 from	major	war	
contingencies	to	a	new	focus	on	mobile	and	flexible	forces	capable	of	responding	to	
limited	 crises	 overseas.	This	 called	 for	 a	 radically	 different	 type	 of	 capability	 than	
had	been	provided	by	 the	Amphibious	Warfare	Squadron	and	eventually	 resulted	
in	a	force	built	around	two	commando	carriers,	two	new	assault	ships	and	six	logistic	
landing	 ships.	 The	 article	 analyses	 alternative	 plans	 for	 the	 shape	 and	 size	 of	 the	
new	 amphibious	 force	 and	 examines	 the	 different	 design	 studies	 that	 resulted.	 It	
identifies	 a	 number	 of	 different	 ship	 types	 that	were	 considered	 and	demonstrates	
that	the	requirement	to	be	able	to	land	a	joint	all-arms	force	of	up	to	a	brigade	group,	
supported	by	tanks	and	artillery,	was	key	to	the	eventual	decision	to	build	Fearless	
and	Intrepid	and	establishes	the	strategic	rationale	that	underpinned	the	construction	
of	these	ships	and	demonstrates	why	they	were	built	as	amphibious	transport	docks	in	
favour	of	the	other	design	options.
In the late 1950s the Royal Navy sought to replace the worn out ships and craft that had constituted its post-war amphibious fleet. The requirement for new 
construction was created by the obsolescence and approaching decrepitude of the 
existing force and also by new strategic circumstances that called for a rather different 
type of capability. The end result was a force based around two helicopter equipped 
‘commando carriers’ and two new dock landing ships, supported by new logistic 
landing ships operated by the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA).2 The dock landing ships 
HMS Fearless and HMS Intrepid were at the heart of this new capability, and continued 
to provide the core of Britain’s amphibious fleet through until the end of the century 
when, finally, they were replaced by new construction.3 This article will examine 
why Fearless and Intrepid were built, and why they were built as they were. It will 
examine the different design studies that were completed, identifying the strengths 
and limitations of each within the context of a new strategic concept that emphasized 
the need to be able to deploy flexible joint (i.e. inter-service) expeditionary forces 
1 I am grateful for the comments of the anonymous reviewers and to the Hon. Editor for the 
assistance that they provided in completing this article.
2 The Logistic Landing Ships (LSLs) were initially operated by the Ministry of Transport until 
they were transferred to the RFA in 1970. 
3 Fearless was decommissioned in 2002, three years after its younger sister Intrepid. They were 
replaced by LPDs Albion	(2003) and Bulwark (2004).
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beyond Europe, with a particular emphasis on the Indian Ocean littoral and the 
Persian Gulf in the region commonly described as ‘east of Suez’.
The large amphibious fleet built up by Britain during the Second World War was 
run down rapidly after 1945, with lend-lease ships and craft returned to the United 
States, merchant ships converted back to trade and many old worn out vessels 
simply scrapped. The core of Britain’s post-war amphibious fleet was provided by 
surviving British built vessels of various types, including the ubiquitous Landing 
Craft Assault (LCA),4 and by ships and craft built towards the end of the war and 
designed for long-range operations in the Pacific. These included the Landing Ship 
Tank Mark Three (LST (3)) and the Landing Craft Tank Mark Eight (LCT (8)) and 
these vessels, with the LCA, provided the main element of Britain’s amphibious fleet 
through until the 1960s.5 The existence of these ships and craft made it possible for 
Britain to maintain some form of amphibious capability at a time when very little 
priority was accorded to amphibious warfare, although most were left to rust in low 
priority reserve. Unfortunately, the ships tended to be slow, have poor sea keeping 
and unsatisfactory living conditions for the embarked force. They also encountered 
some difficulties catering for the latest generation of armoured vehicles that were 
larger and heavier than those which the ships had been designed for.6 The LST(3) was 
supposed to have a top speed of 13.5 knots and the LCT(8) of 12 knots.7 In practice 
they achieved rather less. During Operation Musketeer in November 1956 when 
Britain, in collusion with France and Israel invaded Nasser’s Egypt, the mixed force 
of LSTs and LCTs surpassed all expectations by managing to maintain a speed of just 
eight knots between Malta and Port Said.8
The main priorities for amphibious forces at this time were training and 
development, to provide a cadre for expansion in the later stages of any major war and 
for small-scale raiding, once again, in major war. By the early 1950s there was also a 
considerable emphasis placed on the requirement to maintain a military force through 
the landing of supplies over open beaches or to supply a civilian population in the 
event of the destruction of conventional port facilities.9 A small Amphibious Warfare 
(AW) Squadron capable of lifting a battalion group was created at Malta in 1951 and 
this provided a focus for training and a nucleus for expansion in war. Unfortunately 
it was frequently under-strength and its ships and craft, designed and built according 
to wartime needs and standards, did not provide a very robust or flexible capability. 
The shortcomings of the existing lift were all too apparent to Amphibious Warfare 
Headquarters (AWHQ) in London, which consistently and unsuccessfully agitated 
4 See B. Lavery, Assault	Landing	Craft,	design,	construction	and	operations (Barnsley, 2009).
5 A number of LST(3) were converted to act as infantry assault ships through the expedient of 
adding LCA carried in davits and accommodating troops on the tank deck. In this role they were 
known as Landing Ship Tank (Assault) or simply LST (A). See The National Archives of England 
and Wales, Kew (hereafter, NA): NA DEFE 2/1799, Amphibious	warfare	 ships	 and	 craft, Oct. 
1954.
6 I. Speller, The	Role	of	Amphibious	Warfare	in	British	Defence	Policy,	1945–56 (Basingstoke, 
2001) chapter 5.
7 Allied	Landing	Craft	of	World	War	II	(London, 1985). This book is a reprint of the US Navy’s 
Division of Intelligence Manual ONI	226,	Allied	Landing	Craft	and	Ships (1944).
8 NA ADM 116/6209, Vice Admiral M. Richmond, Naval	Report	on	Operation	Musketeer.
9 For further details see Speller, Amphibious	Warfare, 86–9.
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for the construction of new ships and craft.10 The major problem was that while 
AWHQ was responsible for developing policy and maintained an amphibious 
training and development organization it lacked the institutional clout to force the 
navy to devote scarce resources either to the maintenance in commission of the small 
numbers of ships and craft agreed as the minimum desirable force or to proceed with 
the design and construction of new vessels. The navy, for its part, was reluctant to 
devote resources to something that it saw as a low priority. The fact that amphibious 
warfare was a joint task, that essentially required the navy to provide a service for the 
army, did not encourage Admiralty interest.11 
The Suez crisis in 1956 highlighted the shortcomings of an approach that left 
barely enough vessels in commission to embark a battalion group. It took months 
to recommission enough old ships and craft to support Operation Musketeer	and 
the delay that this imposed made a significant contribution to the political collapse 
that defined that operation. Equally, the decrepit nature of some of the ships and 
their painfully slow speed and poor endurance complicated the tactical conduct of 
operations.12 By this time, however, national defence priorities had already begun to 
shift away from a focus on major war contingencies in Europe and to place greater 
emphasis on the need for mobile and flexible forces capable of responding to more 
limited crises overseas. This process was reinforced by the debacle at Suez and led, 
for the first time since the war, to a renewed interest in amphibious forces within the 
Admiralty. This interest was given some urgency as the existing lift was approaching 
the end of its useful life and would need to be replaced within a few years.
By the mid-1950s it was becoming clear to British planners that nuclear stalemate 
made a major war in Europe unlikely and, if one did occur, it was likely to result in an 
early and devastating nuclear exchange. In such circumstances the role of the Royal 
Navy was ‘somewhat uncertain’, as the 1957 Defence White Paper made clear.13 
However, the pressure of the Cold War and the process of European decolonization 
in Africa and Asia increased the potential for limited conflict overseas. Even before 
Operation Musketeer	the navy had begun to revise its priorities and had identified 
a new role in providing mobile and flexible forces for use in limited war and crisis 
management. This implied a reduced emphasis on major war in Europe and a new 
focus on expeditionary capabilities for contingencies further afield. The change in 
approach was reflected in a new concept for the Future	Role	of	the	Navy, presented 
to the Chiefs of Staff in July 1956, that argued that the navy would protect British 
interests overseas through the deployment of a task-force built around an aircraft 
carrier, a commando equipped helicopter carrier, a cruiser and four destroyers, all 
based at Singapore.14 These new priorities were reinforced by failure of the old 
10 AWHQ, formerly Combined Operations Headquarters, was a joint organization with 
responsibility for the development of amphibious training and techniques under the Chief of 
Amphibious Warfare and responsible directly to the Ministry of Defence.
11 See Speller, Amphibious	Warfare, passim.
12 NA ADM 116/6209. See also I. Speller, ‘The Suez Crisis (Operation Musketeer, November 
1956) in T. Lovering (ed.), Amphibious	Assault.	Manoeuvre	from	the	sea	from	Gallipoli	to	the	Gulf 
(Rendlesham, 2007), 421–36.
13 British Parliamentary Papers, (hereafter, BPP), BPP Cmnd.124., Defence:	Outline	of	future	
policy	1957	(London, 1957)
14 NA DEFE 5/70, COS (56) 280, 20 Jul. 1956.
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approach at Suez and were codified in the Autumn	Naval	Rethink of 1957.15 
An early result of this new focus on amphibious forces was the Admiralty’s 
decision in 1956 to convert a light fleet carrier into a helicopter carrier for amphibious 
purposes.16 The decision reflected recent developments in the United States and 
AWHQ had, for some time, been pressing for such a conversion.17 Operation 
Musketeer provided an opportunity to test the idea in combat, and on 6 November 
1956 the marines of No. 45 Commando were landed at Port Said by helicopters 
operating from HMS Ocean and HMS Theseus.18 This success was followed by 
the conversion in 1959 of the Centaur class aircraft carrier HMS Bulwark into a 
helicopter equipped ‘commando carrier’. The vessel recommissioned in its new role 
in January 1960 and was followed two years later by its sister ship, HMS Albion. 
The commando carriers were designed to carry, support and maintain under 
operational conditions a battalion sized Royal Marines Commando unit and could, 
if necessary, embark an additional Commando unit and a brigade headquarters 
for a short period of time. They could land the embarked force using their own 
dedicated squadron of medium lift helicopters, initially 16 Westland Whirlwinds.19 
As converted aircraft carriers they had a speed and range far in excess of the ships of 
the old AW Squadron and proved to be extremely versatile assets in a wide range of 
circumstances, particularly once the more capable Wessex replaced the Whirlwind 
and the Commando units were reinforced with additional administrative and 
support elements and joint assets, including light 105-mm guns from 29 Commando 
Regiment, Royal Artillery. What the commando carriers could not do, however, 
was to land heavy vehicles or armour in the assault and it was the belief that this 
capability continued to be important that determined the nature of the replacement 
for the worn out ships of the AW Squadron.
There were two different but related elements to the question of replacement 
amphibious ships and craft. There was assault shipping, designed to land troops in 
the initial stages of any operation and needed to replace the ageing and inadequate 
ships of the AW Squadron. In addition there was also a need to cater for logistic 
shipping designed to bring follow-on forces, reinforcements and supplies after the 
initial assault, and also for transport duties in peacetime. The latter role was currently 
undertaken by a fleet of old LST(3)s that had been transferred to the army for that 
purpose. Manned by civilian rather than naval crews they were known as WD (War 
Department) LSTs. In a crisis they could be supported by naval LSTs and LCTs 
brought out of reserve, by requisitioned merchant shipping, or by conventional naval 
vessels operating as makeshift landing ships.20 In common with their counter-parts 
15 E. J. Grove, Vanguard	to	Trident.	British	Naval	Policy	Since	World	War	II	(London, 1987), 
210.
16 NA DEFE 5/70 COS (56) 280, 20 Jul. 1956. 
17 NA DEFE 2/1901, docket AW 558/55, folio 39, note from AWHQ to the Secretary of the 
Admiralty, 20 Jul. 1955.
18 The Marines were landed in an area of the beach that had already been secured by the seaborne 
force. For further details see NA ADM 202/455, Brigadier R. W. Madoc, 3	Commando	Brigade	
Royal	Marines	–	Operation	Musketeer	Report.
19 NA DEFE 5/85, COS (58) 219, 18 Sept 1958. Royal Marines Museum, Eastney,	 AWHQ	
Information	Letter	No.	9, 1958.
20 NA DEFE 4/103, SRC (57)10 at annex to COS (58) 3rd meeting, 9 Jan. 1958
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in the AW Squadron, the WD LSTs were approaching the end of their useful lives.
A necessary preliminary to deciding on the nature of any replacement shipping 
was some agreement on the likely need. Initial studies in the aftermath of Operation 
Musketeer	were based on a Joint Planning Staff (JPS) report that identified the 
short-term requirement to be the ability to contribute to an allied operation by 
being able to land an assault force of two battalions with light support in the eastern 
Mediterranean within 28 days.21 The size of the assault force was determined by the 
perceived limitations of the existing naval lift and was thus more useful as a reminder 
of current constraints than as a reasonable basis for long-term planning. The Chief 
of Amphibious Warfare, Major General James Moulton RM, argued in favour of 
planning for the employment of a full brigade group, with the assaulting element of 
two battalions and two armoured squadrons catered for in naval shipping and the 
remaining force carried in logistic lift, as had been the case during Musketeer.22 The 
army and navy supported this approach and, although the Royal Air Force (RAF) 
were much less convinced of the need for a force of this size, in January 1958 the 
Chiefs of Staff agreed that the lift required for an amphibious operation would be 
for a commando or battalion at light scales at immediate notice and for a full brigade 
group, with two battalions/commandos and some armour in the assault, within 28 
days.23 Unfortunately, it proved to be impossible to provide this economically using 
ships and craft currently available and so the requirement was later relaxed to the 
need to land a small lightly supported force within 18 days or for a full brigade 
group, with armour and supporting arms, within 35 days.24 
In March 1959 Major General Moulton summarized AWHQ’s appreciation of 
the long term requirement for amphibious shipping.25 He noted that recent events 
pointed to the need for ‘speed of action, for increasing independence of colonial 
bases and terminals, and for the ability to avoid the Suez air/sea barrier’,	the latter 
point referring to the barrier to British military air and sea movement formed by 
unfriendly states in the Middle East. He also suggested that, while close cooperation 
with the United States was to be expected, in conflicts short of war there were liable 
to be differences of interest and that therefore ‘the more balanced and self-reliant 
our forces, the better will we be able to further British interests, whether in an allied 
operation or independently.’ In his opinion air and sea lift and stockpiling represented 
complementary methods of projecting British influence. Airlift provided the best 
means of moving troops over long distances, but sea lift was required to carry the 
heavy tonnages and large numbers of vehicles required for sustained operations, 
whether they came from the UK or from local stockpiles. He also noted that the 
tonnages required to establish a forward air terminal, particularly aviation fuel, were 
best handled by sea.
AWHQ concurred with the War Office view that the standard brigade group with 
supporting arms would be the basic formation for seaborne operations, emphasizing 
21 ‘Light support’ included one battery of field artillery, one squadron of armour and a brigade 
headquarters. NA DEFE 4/100, COS (57) 76th meeting, 3 Oct. 1957.
22 Ibid.
23 NA DEFE 4/103, COS (58) 3rd meeting, 9 Jan. 1958.
24 NA DEFE 5/88, COS (59) 333, report by the JPS, 10 Feb. 1959.
25 NA DEFE 5/90 pt 1, COS (59) 67, Long	term	requirement	for	amphibious	shipping, 20 Mar. 
1959.
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the continuing need for a force that could ‘hit hard, move fast and sustain action’ as 
the most effective means of ‘settling trouble at least cost in casualties, prestige and 
time’. Potential enemies were likely to be armed with modern weapons, including 
armour. The possibility that an enemy might have nuclear weapons was also noted 
and Moulton suggested that, to avoid nuclear blackmail, Britain needed to develop a 
‘fast moving, hard-hitting technique which will confront the enemy with technically 
superior forces and limit temptation to use atomic weapons, should he have them’.26 
AWHQ thus favoured fast moving, hard-hitting amphibious forces based on a 
standard army brigade group. To this end they supported the development of new, 
faster and more flexible techniques in amphibious operations, seeking to identify 
synergies between amphibious and airborne forces. This was to bear fruit in the new 
seaborne/airborne concept, unveiled in 1961 and eventually incorporated into a new 
Manual of Joint Warfare in 1964.27 In terms of the requirement for new ships and 
craft they suggested that the choice lay between the maintenance of two commando 
carriers or a mixed lift incorporating one commando carrier plus some LSTs or 
a vessel similar to the wartime Landing Ship Dock (LSD). The latter option was 
favoured as an all-carrier force would not be able to transport and land the vehicles 
and heavy equipment required by the brigade group. The Admiralty were invited to 
finalize design studies for a naval landing ship for the assault and to make provision 
for an LSD or LST in the 1960/61 estimates. 
It was not the first time that AWHQ had invited the Admiralty to undertake 
design work and to proceed with the construction of amphibious ships. They had 
done so on a regular basis since 1945, always to no avail.28 This time, however, things 
were different. Amphibious operations were now at the heart of the Admiralty’s 
plans for a navy focused on the need to project power east of Suez. The Royal 
Navy was reinventing itself as a tool for the projection of British power overseas 
and amphibious forces played an important part in this. The process began under 
First Sea Lord (and former Chief of Combined Operations) Admiral Lord Louis 
Mountbatten and continued to gain momentum so that by 1962 the Statement 
on the Naval Estimates justified all types of naval vessel, from aircraft carriers 
to minesweepers and submarines, through reference to their utility in support of 
amphibious operations and made no mention of any other role.29 Amphibious forces 
also had powerful backers within Whitehall. Harold Watkinson, Minister of Defence 
from 1959 to 1962, was a notable supporter.30 
Mountbatten’s successor as First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Charles Lambe, was keen 
to portray amphibious forces as being part of a joint capability and, in 1959, proposed 
that the three services should form a Joint Services Seaborne Force capable of lifting 
a brigade group and built around two commando carriers, and a mixture of RN 
LSTs, WD LSTs, a troopship and a motor transport ship. The force would be based 
26 Ibid.
27 For the seaborne/airborne concept see NA DEFE 5/114, COS (61) 180, Seaborne/Airborne/
Land	Concept, 8 Jun. 1961 and NA DEFE 2/2074, Joint Warfare Staff, 31 Jul. 1962. For the Manual 
of Joint Warfare see NA DEFE 73/1, Manual	of	Joint	Warfare.	Volume	1:	Concept,	planning	and	
control	of	operations. 
28 See Speller, The	Role	of	Amphibious	Warfare, passim.
29 BPP Cmnd 1629, Explanatory	Statement	on	the	Navy	Estimates	1962–1963, (London, 1962).
30 H. Watkinson, Turning	Points:	A	record	of	our	times (Salisbury, 1986).
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at Aden and held at 14 days notice to move. It would provide a mobile and flexible 
capability to intervene in a wide range of different circumstances, with the security 
of Kuwait prominent. Lambe argued that the idea offered a ‘mobile force of good 
striking power and flexibility’ and ‘a promising opportunity of avoiding the wasteful 
process of setting up expensive shore installations in successively threatened areas 
where security of tenure is doubtful’.31	The force would require an additional 1,700 
naval personnel and some cost for the commissioning of the second commando 
carrier and the refit and air-conditioning of LSTs. Unfortunately, the Chief of the 
Defence Staff, Marshal of the RAF Sir William Dickinson, was far from convinced 
that the proposal offered real value for money and the Chiefs of Staff agreed that, in 
the short-term, it was not worth pursuing the idea.32 
The concept of a Joint Services Seaborne Force did not go away however. In May 
1961 the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Caspar John, developed a case designed to cater 
for a scenario where the British possessed no bases east of Suez except in Australia. 
In these circumstances he proposed to deploy military strength from a Joint Services 
Seaborne Force able to put ashore a balanced brigade group, supported by aircraft 
carriers. He went further than Lambe, arguing that there should be two powerful 
amphibious groups, each capable of lifting a brigade group, so that, with rotation, 
one would always be available.33 John was at pains to stress the inter-service nature 
of this force, which would embark army personnel and equipment and could be 
supported by land based aircraft and airborne forces when operating within range of 
a friendly base. His concept, requiring four commando carriers, four assault ships and 
six aircraft carriers was never likely to gain approval from the other services given the 
excessive cost implications. The navy did, however, gain approval for the provision 
east of Suez of one Amphibious Group and the deployment there of both commando 
carriers and also the two new assault ships that had, by then, been approved.34
Amphibious forces were therefore at the heart of the navy’s plans for the future.35 
The need for replacement shipping was embraced by the Admiralty and accepted by 
the other services. The army were eager to ensure that any new ships should be able 
to accommodate the full range of equipment required by a standard brigade group, 
including armour and artillery. The brigade group was recognized to be both the 
largest force liable to be available at short notice and also the smallest force capable of 
independent operations against ‘moderate’ opposition. The RAF preferred to focus 
on operations against weaker opposition, where light forces alone would suffice, 
reflecting their preference for airborne and air transported forces. However, faced 
with the opposition of the other two services they did not press the issue at this stage. 
The JPS were given the task of developing detailed proposals for replacement 
amphibious ships and craft. Before they did this an Admiralty and AWHQ study 
group undertook a technical examination of the issue.36 This examination was based 
31 NA DEFE 5/92, COS (59) 137, Joint	Services	Seaborne	Force, 12 Jun. 1959. NA DEFE 4/119, 
COS (59) 38th mtg, item 3, 16 Jun. 1959.
32 NA: DEFE 4/119, COS (59) 38th mtg, item 3, 16 Jun. 1959.
33 NA ADM 205/192, Presentation	of	Alternative	Long-term	Naval	Programme, 17 May 1961.
34 NA DEFE 7/2235, COS (61) 499, digest of report of COS (62) 1. NA CAB 131/27, D (61) 1st 
mtg, 12 Jan 1962.
35 Grove, Vanguard	to	Trident, chapter 7.
36 NA DEFE 5/86, COS (58) 254, 13 Nov. 1958.
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on the assumption that there was no requirement for sea-borne assault forces solely 
for major war purposes and that the commando carrier would suffice for internal 
security operations overseas. They did not foresee involvement in limited war without 
allies, except in the Arabian Peninsula. In contrast to previous studies, which focused 
on the confined waters of the Mediterranean, the need to be able to conduct ocean 
passages of 2,000 to 3,000 miles was stressed, as was the requirement for speed. The 
largest formation liable to be available for a seaborne assault was the brigade group, 
perhaps supplemented by an airborne brigade, and thus the examination based its 
findings on the need for naval shipping to cater for the assault elements of a standard 
brigade group, specifically; two battalion groups at assault scales, two field batteries, 
two squadrons of armour and a brigade headquarters. Follow-on forces would arrive 
in civilian manned shipping and this was the subject of a separate enquiry.
The study group identified five alternatives:
a) LCT(9) This was an updated version of the existing LCT(8). Sketch designs 
suggested it would carry 60 men and six tanks or 13 3-ton equivalents at a speed 
of up to 12 knots. It did not possess the ocean-going capability intended and, as it 
lacked accommodation for any troops beyond the vehicle crews, such craft would 
need to be supplemented by troopships or similar vessels. 
b) Bow-loading LST This ship, similar in design to existing LSTs, was to embark 
half a battalion group including 465 troops, eight tanks, four self-propelled guns 
and 27 vehicles and had to be able to land them on a beach gradient of 1 in 120. Two 
designs were investigated, BL/C and BL/D, with an estimated speed of 14 knots and 
16 knots respectively. It was not believed that they would be able to design a ship 
with a sustained speed in excess of 16 knots. To land forces on beaches shallower 
than 1 in 120 a long causeway, too long to be carried on a single ship, would need 
to be used. Given the vulnerability of such a large ship it would probably not be 
acceptable to beach it in the early stages of an assault and, therefore, Duplex Drive 
(DD) equipment would be required if tanks were needed ashore.
c) Stern-loading LST The stern loader shared many of the characteristics of the 
bow-loader but, in lacking bow doors, it had improved speed and sea keeping gained 
at the cost of not being able to beach itself. Instead forces would be launched from 
the stern of the vessel using DD equipment or some form of landing craft or ferry. 
The possibility of using helicopters to land troops and equipment was identified. 
The difficulty in landing heavy vehicles, and the delays inherent in a ferry-system of 
landing meant that this type was rejected.
d) Amphibious Transport Dock (ATD) Similar in design to an LSD this vessel 
combined good range and passage speed with the ability to land troops and vehicles 
using landing craft carried in its stern dock. It did suffer from some of the problems 
of the ferry system but, unlike the stern-loading LST, could embark forces within 
its protected dock, making it far less dependent on good weather to unload. It could 
also load two landing craft simultaneously. Large vessels, such as design study DL/A 
(11,500 tons) were considered to be too big for British purposes, representing a 
dangerous case of putting ‘too many eggs in one basket’. A smaller vessel, capable 
of lifting two-thirds of a battalion group, was preferred and this was catered for in 
design study DL/B (8,000 tons). 
e) US built-ships and craft The purchase of US ships was considered, but in 
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general they were viewed as being larger than was suitable for the British force. It 
was noted that the latest US LSTs had good speed and sea keeping, but that they 
lacked the necessary beaching characteristics. It was also suggested that American-
built ships had the disadvantage that they might come with ‘diplomatic	 strings’ 
attached to their use.37
It was clear that different ship types offered different strengths. The ATD promised 
good speed, range and sea keeping, allowing it to keep up with the commando 
carrier. Unfortunately, it could only land non-DD vehicles by ferry, an inherently 
time consuming business. The bow-loading LST, on the other hand, was slower but 
could land its vehicles directly onto the beach, although doing so in the early stages 
of an assault was not recommended due to its vulnerability to enemy fire. Such ships 
offered the best way of meeting army requirements for the lift and unloading of 
all forms of vehicles. However, if the assault lift was composed entirely of LSTs 
this would cause problems when operating with the commando carrier or with US 
forces which, it was noted, adopted a concept where the assault element travelled 
in fast helicopter landing ships (LPH) and ATDs (designated LPDs in US service), 
with follow-on forces arriving in slower LSTs. With regards to the requirement 
37 Ibid.
Table 1 Technical examination: general design characteristics
Design	 Deep	 Max.	 Dimensions	 Draught	 Ship’s	 Military	load
	 displace-	 speed	 length	x	 	 complement
	 ment	(tons)	 	 breadth	(ft)
SL/A 5,380 24 knots 400 x 54 14ft 10 in 150 465 troops, 8 tanks,
      4 SP guns and 27 3-ton  
      equivalents
SL/B 3,970 17 knots 390 x 52 11ft 8in 109 465 troops, 8 tanks,
      4 SP guns and 27 3-ton  
      equivalents
SL/C 4,750 20 knots 390 x 52 13ft 5in 109 465 troops, 8 tanks,
      4 SP guns and 27 3-ton  
      equivalents
BL/C 3,920 15 knots 400 x 55 9ft 7in 109 465 troops, 8 tanks,
      4 SP guns & 27 3-ton  
      equivalents
BL/D 4,670 17 knots 400 x 55 11ft 1 in 109 465 troops, 8 tanks,
      4 Sp guns and 21 3-ton  
      equivalents
DL/A 11,500 21 knots 500 x 82 18ft 3in 385 1080 troops, 18 tanks,
      8 SP guns and 60 3-ton  
      equivalents
DL/B 8,000 23 knots 450 x 70 16ft 289 700 troops, 12 tanks
      6 SP guns and 40 3-ton  
      equivalents
 
Key: SL/A, SL/B, & SL/C = Stern Loading LST
 BL/C & BL/D = Bow Loading LST
 DL/A & DL/B = Amphibious Transport Dock
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for a HQ ship they believed that this vessel would also need to be able to carry 
vehicles (including those required by the land force HQ) and that the requirement 
could be met in the same hull as the assault ships. Overall, the technical examination 
concluded that the choice appeared to lie between design studies BL/D and DL/B. 
Sketch designs for the different ships considered by the study are shown at figures 
(i) to (vii).38 See appendix A.
The examination reflected a noticeable change in thinking about the assault 
shipping. The requirement for speed and a capability to conduct ocean passages 
reflected the limited war role and an emphasis on operations in support of policy 
beyond Europe, rather than short-ranged assaults in home waters. The continued 
emphasis on a balanced landing force and, in particular, the need to land armour in 
the assault played a key role in raising design challenges and also costs. The need to 
balance the incompatible demands of speed, payload and beaching/unloading ability 
made inevitable a compromise on one or more of these characteristics.
The focus on being able to land a balanced military force of up to a brigade group 
reflected current thinking about the likely scale of operations in situations short of 
global war and this was reflected in the key study of ‘British Strategy in the Sixties’ 
undertaken in 1961. For the purposes of that study it was accepted that Britain 
would not attempt to intervene in the face of heavy opposition requiring a full-
scale assault without the assistance of allies. However, British forces might have to 
intervene in circumstances where the points of entry were in hostile hands.39 The 
Admiralty therefore proceeded on the basis that they needed to be able to land a 
balanced brigade group, against opposition if necessary. The army view was that 
it was difficult to visualize operations where a force of less than one brigade group 
would be required to make a successful assault against opposition and that it was vital 
that any landing force should include armour and artillery.40 In April 1959 the Chief 
of the Imperial General Staff, General Sir Francis Festing rejected RAF suggestions 
that air power could substitute for friendly armour, stating that:
We must retain the ability to carry out an amphibious assault with balanced 
forces . . . it would be unrealistic to assume that in all cases an assault could be 
carried out without tanks; air support could not always be guaranteed and an 
enemy possessing only a few tanks could seriously embarrass, if not actually 
defeat, a landing which had no tanks in the assault.41
It is worth noting that in May 1942 Festing had commanded the 29th Infantry 
Brigade who landed at Diego Suarez during Operation Ironclad, the Allied invasion 
of Madagascar, as part of a balanced force including tanks and artillery.42
The Admiralty/AWHQ technical examination was followed, in May 1959, by the 
JPS Long Term Study. Requested by the Chiefs of Staff in February 1958, this paper 
was supposed to report on the long-term world-wide operational requirement for 
amphibious lift. Unfortunately the Joint Planners had not been able to agree on the 
38 Ibid.
39 NA DEFE 5/123, COS (62) 1, British	Strategy	in	the	1960s, 9 Jan. 1962.
40 For example see NA DEFE 4/103, COS (58) 3rd mtg, 9 Jan. 1958.
41 NA DEFE 4/117, COS (59) 24th mtg, 7 Apr. 1959, item 4.
42 See T. Benbow, ‘The British invasion of Madagascar: Operation Ironclad, May 1942’ in 
Lovering (ed.), Amphibious	Assault, 107–22.
	 The	Replacement	of	the	Royal	Navy’s	Amphibious	Warfare	Squadron	 187
assumptions upon which to base this enquiry and so instead they merely identified 
alternative means of providing a long term capability for amphibious operations, 
leaving the Chiefs of Staff to decide between a range of alternatives.43 It is perhaps 
not surprising that the JPS could not agree. While the army and the navy remained 
sure of the need for assault shipping to land a balanced brigade group, including 
tanks and artillery, the RAF was far from convinced. The view from within the Air 
Ministry was that amphibious forces were not required for cold war or internal 
security duties, for which they favoured airborne forces. They believed that the 
requirement for an amphibious assault was restricted to limited war operations 
and that the maximum lift that should be contemplated was for only two battalions 
lightly equipped, a force rather similar to that which could be air lifted. 44 Having 
joint planners does not always ensure joint priorities.
Nevertheless, with the army, navy and AWHQ all focused in the need to embark 
and land a balanced force, the JPS built on the principles established in previous 
studies and remained focused on the need to be able to put ashore in an assault, within 
28 days, a brigade group of three battalions, a brigade headquarters, two squadrons of 
tanks and two batteries of field artillery. They noted that it was no longer appropriate 
to give ‘undue	emphasis’ to the eastern Mediterranean and identified the problem 
posed by the Middle East ‘air/sea barrier’ formed by unfriendly states unlikely to 
permit over-flight and by the potential closure of the Suez canal. Planning proceeded 
on the basis that Britain could not count on getting the use of a port or airfield in the 
early stages of an operation and that it would be unsound to rely on the immediate 
availability of adequate reception facilities. 
The speed and flexibility of helicopter and airborne forces was recognized as a 
particular advantage for limited and cold war operations, but their inherent lack 
of organic heavy support was identified as placing them at a disadvantage against 
an enemy in prepared positions or equipped with armoured fighting vehicles. The 
JPS did not envisage a requirement to conduct an assault against a heavily defended 
coastline, but did believe that an assault lift should be retained that permitted the 
close and intimate support of guns and armour. Some consideration was given to the 
use of tactical nuclear weapons as one means of overcoming prepared defences, and 
thus reducing the requirement for organic armour support, but obvious political and 
practical problems made this an unattractive proposition.45
The report considered four main types of ship, based on the design studies from 
the Admiralty/AWHQ technical examination. For the assault they looked at the 
commando carrier, the ATD46 and the LST(A).47 For the follow-up they looked at 
an improved version of the WD LST. In common with earlier reports, the use of 
Royal Navy shipping for both the assault and follow-up was rejected as being too 
expensive. Two alternative means of meeting the 28-day time scale were suggested:
43 NA DEFE 4/118, JP (58) 24, Report by the JPS, 11 May 1959; at annex to COS (59) 32nd 
Meeting, item 2, 26 May 1959. 
44 NA: AIR 8/2235, brief for the CAS by DASB, 6 April 1959; also see brief for CAS for COS 
meeting on 26 May 1959.
45 JP (58) 24.
46 Design studies DL/A (large ATD) and DL/B (small ATD).
47 Design study BL/D.
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Case A HMS Bulwark plus either three small or two large ATDs
Case B HMS Bulwark plus a second commando carrier and two small ATDs
In both cases nine WD LSTs would be needed on either side of the barrier for 
follow-on forces or, to save money, a total of nine WD LSTs could be based on 
whichever side of the barrier they were most likely to be needed. Case B provided 
the possibility of basing on either side of the barrier a balanced force consisting of 
one commando carrier, one ATD and nine WD LSTs. Unfortunately, with only two 
ATDs some vehicles intended for the assault would have to be carried in the follow-
up and up to 20 3-ton equivalents would be lost from the overall lift unless larger and 
more expensive ATDs were considered.
The JPS also considered cheaper alternatives based around the ability to conduct 
an assault at less than brigade group strength within 28 days with the capability to 
increase the assault lift to brigade scale at greater notice. Extending the time scale 
allowed for the use of slower LSTs, and for the maintenance of fewer WD LSTs 
either side of the barrier (nine in total).48 Four options were advanced, see table 2.49
The ATD was preferred to the LST(A) as it was faster and better able to land tanks 
given that the LST(A) was too large and vulnerable to beach in the early stages of an 
assault. The JPS therefore preferred cases C and D to E and F and, between C and 
D, they preferred the latter.
The JPS also devised options for an assault force that was not capable of lifting 
a brigade group, with a brigade size force only being built up subsequent to the 
assault. Two cases were advanced, see table 3.
Option G was identified as offering the best force for conducting an assault over 
a beach as it provided for a more balanced landing force. Option H, with its two 
commando carriers, offered advantages of speed and flexibility in situations where 
a beach landing was not required, but was limited in its ability to land vehicles and 
heavy equipment.
The requirement for a headquarters ship for the Naval Assault Group commander 
and the Assault Brigade Commander was also examined. The latter would deploy 
ashore once the beachhead had been secured and there was an advantage in the 
Brigade HQ vehicles being deployed with the HQ prior to this eventuality. Given 
48 JP (58) 24.
49 Capital costs and manpower costs in all cases (including Case G and H) excluded those for 
Bulwark which had already been accounted for in Admiralty plans.
Table 2 Alternative options for assault shipping (i)
	 Case	C	 Case	D	 Case	E	 Case	F
Commando Carrier 1 2 1 2
ATD 3 small or 2 large 2 small — —
LST(A) — — 5 4
WD LST 9 9 9 9
RN manpower* 900 1,390/900 550 1,230/1,530
Civilian manpower (WD) 585 585 585 585
Capital cost 29.4m 30.8m 29m 32.6m
* The requirement for Royal Navy manpower varied depending on which particular light fleet 
carrier was converted into the second commando carrier.
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this, the ATD represented a better platform for the HQ than did the commando 
carrier.
Of all the options presented by the JPS the RAF were inclined to favour Case H, 
the closest to their own concept of light but quick intervention forces.50 The army, 
on the other hand, favoured Case C or Case D as provision of two or more ATDs 
offered the best means of landing armour and heavy equipment in the early stages 
of any operation.51 After discussion the Chiefs of Staff agreed that detailed design 
studies should start on an ATD and a WD LST and that the Centaur	class light fleet 
carrier HMS Albion	should be earmarked for a possible conversion to a commando 
carrier. Case C and Case D were accepted as suitable hypothetical bases to carry out 
detailed costings.52 These costings were completed by November 1959. In order to 
maintain in service the required number of ships additional vessels would need to be 
maintained in operational reserve. The full requirement for Case C was thus for two 
commando carriers, four ATDs and nine WD LSTs. Similarly, Case D required three 
commando carriers, three ATD and nine WD LSTs. As an alternative to this expense 
the Admiralty prepared cases C+ and D+. Case C+ provided for one commando 
carrier and one ATD in commission and two ATDs in reserve. Case D+ provided 
for one commando carrier and one ATD in commission and one each in reserve (see 
table 4).
In December 1959 the Minister of Defence, Harold Watkinson, submitted the new 
naval construction programme to the Defence Committee. Admiralty Long Term 
Costings catered for an amphibious force based on Case D+. The first new assault 
ship (ATD) was planned to complete in 1964.53 Watkinson was a firm believer in the 
value of amphibious forces as an important way of bringing mobility and flexibility to 
Britain’s armed forces. He pressed his cabinet colleagues to approve two new assault 
50 NA AIR 8/2245
51 NA DEFE 4/118, COS (59) 32nd meeting, item 2, 26 May 1959.
52 Ibid.
53 NA CAB 131/22, D (59) 40, 22 Dec 1959, memo by Minister of Defence.
Table 3 Alternative options for assault shipping (ii)
	 Case	G	 Case	H
Commando Carrier 1 2
ATD 2 small 1
LST(A) — —
WD LST 9 9
RN manpower 600 1,090/1390
Civilian manpower (WD) 585 585
Capital cost 24.1m 25.5m
Table 4 Alternative options for assault shipping (iii)
	 Case	C	 Case	D	 Case	C+	 Case	D+
Commando carrier 2 3 1 2
ATD 4 3 3 2
WD LST 9 9 9 9
Additional RN Manpower 1,900 2,600 1,125 850
Annual maintenance cost £1.71m £3.08m £0.56m £0.62m
Capital expenditure £45.07m £48.58m £34.56m £31.25m
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ships, arguing that their ‘qualities of speed, seakeeping and endurance will transform 
the effectiveness of our amphibious capabilities’.54 Having secured agreement for 
the conversion of HMS Albion he then pushed to have both commando carriers 
in commission, rather than keeping one in reserve. The Chiefs of Staff backed this 
decision and Cabinet approval was gained in February 1961 when the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer removed Treasury objections. The Chancellor also agreed that the 
construction of the first ATD, described as a Seaborne Support Ship (Assault Ship), 
should proceed. 55
The plan to build a new assault ship to replace the AW Squadron was announced 
in the 1961 Navy Estimates.56 The design for this ship was approved by the Board 
of Admiralty in March 1961. The ship was to be 12,100 tons deep displacement 57 
with a trials speed of 21 knots, provided by a two-shaft steam turbine machinery.58 It 
would have accommodation for up to 700 men and carry 15 tanks, six self-propelled 
guns, 50 loaded three ton trucks and ninety tons of stores. The ship would carry 
four landing craft at davits and embark larger craft in a stern dock. By flooding 
the dock, loaded landing craft would float out through a stern gate in the same 
manner as with an LSD or the US Raleigh class LPDs then under construction. 
Space would be provided on the after-end of the weather deck for the operation of 
Wessex helicopters. The ship would be fitted out as a Naval Assault Group/Brigade 
headquarters ship. The only armament provided was to be four Seacat launchers 
with eight missiles each and two Bofors guns. The Board directed that for any future 
assault ships, consideration should be given to fitting a 4.5 inch turret in order to 
provide some self-defence capability against surface attack. The estimated cost of 
this vessel was £8,750,000 excluding the cost of craft, stores, ammunition, fuel etc.59 
The contract for this ship, dubbed Landing Ship Assault, was placed with Harland 
and Wolff at Belfast in December 1961.60 The 1962 Navy Estimates noted that the 
first assault ship had been ordered and announced that a second would be ordered 
during that financial year.61 
The first assault ship, HMS Fearless, was launched in December 1963 and 
commissioned in November 1965. The second ship, HMS Intrepid,	was launched 
at John Brown’s Clydebank shipyard in June 1964 and commissioned in 1967. At 
12,120 tons full load, with a crew of 580 and capable of 21 knots the ships could carry 
400 troops, 15 tanks and 27 vehicles and could, in an emergency, embark 700 troops 
at the expense of some vehicle lift. Capable of carrying a balanced military force on 
an ocean passage in company with the commando carriers, these ships represented 
a considerable improvement on the old AW Squadron. Each ship had a flight deck 
54 NA CAB 131/24, D (60) 54, memo by the Minister of Defence, 2 Dec. 1960.
55 Ibid. NA CAB 131/23, D (60) 12th mtg, 7 Dec. 1960. NA DEFE 7/1678, D (61) 17, memo by 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 20 Feb. 1961.
56 BPP Cmnd 1282, Explanatory	Statement	on	the	Navy	Estimates	1961–1962 (London, 1961) 
57 This represented an increase from the original Staff Requirement of 10,000 tons and a sketch 
design of 11,540 tons. All tonnages given are for deep displacement. NA ADM 167/157, B.1333, 
Assault	Ship:	Sketch	design, memo by the Controller, 9 May 1960.
58 When decommissioned in 2002 Fearless was the last steam powered ship in the Royal Navy.
59 NA ADM 167/159, Board Minute 5482 and Memo B.1382. 
60 NA DEFE 5/124, COS (62) 81, 21 Feb 1962, report by Chief of Amphibious Warfare. 
61 BPP Cmnd 1629. Explanatory	Statement	on	the	Navy	Estimates	1962–1963, (London, 1962).
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with facilities for up to five Wessex helicopters and carried four LCVPs at davits and 
four Landing Craft Utility in their dock. The latter were designed to each be able to 
land two Centurion tanks or an equivalent load. In the event, neither ship was fitted 
with a 4.5 inch gun. After 15 years of valuable service with the Royal Navy they were 
to display their worth by playing a central part in the successful amphibious landings 
of the Falklands conflict in 1982.62 
The assault ships, given the US-style designation LPD,63 were supported by 
six new 5,674 ton Landing Ship Logistic (LSL) launched between 1963 and 1967 
and designed to replace the WD LSTs. The requirement for follow-on shipping 
was different to that for the LPDs in that the ships were not required to arrive so 
quickly and they were not expected to land troops or vehicles in an assault. They 
were, however, required to carry all of the supporting equipment that would be 
required by a brigade group and to be able to land their cargo efficiently without 
recourse to conventional port facilities. The ships would also need to be suitable for 
use in general military transport duties between operations. After detailed enquiries 
it was agreed that an improved bow-loading LST was the most suitable vessel.64 The 
factors that made LSTs unsuitable for the assault fleet, primarily limited speed and 
the difficulty of landing armour in an assault, did not apply to the follow-on force.65 
All six ships participated in the 1982 Falklands Conflict and continued in British 
service until replaced from 2006 by the introduction of four new 16,000 ton Bay-
class Landing Ship Dock (Auxiliary).66
The LPDs and LSLs were built to meet a particular requirement. They were 
designed to support the assault landing of a balanced army brigade group with 
supporting arms, including armour and artillery. The LPDs were chosen specifically 
because of their ability to support a joint all-arms landing force. The requirement 
to land tanks in an assault had a major impact on the decision to adopt the ATD 
type design. No other ship type offered the possibility of landing armour in the 
early stages of an assault while also providing for reasonably high speed on an ocean 
passage. Design study DL/A, for a vessel capable of embarking 1,050 troops, was 
ruled out as too large and instead design DL/B was adopted, catering for a smaller 
ship able to take three-quarters of a brigade group (i.e. 700 troops). However, it 
proved impossible to meet this requirement in a ship of only 8,000 tons and Fearless	
and Intrepid	eventually displaced 12,100 tons, 600 tons more than DL/A. 
Fearless	and Intrepid	were not particularly innovative ships. Their basic design 
owed much to the LSD developed during the war and the US Navy had already 
62 NA DEFE 5/150, COS 109/64, 2 April 1964. Conway’s	All	the	World’s	Fighting	Ships,	1947–
1982.	Part	One:	The	Western	Powers (London, 1983). 
63 In US parlance ‘LP’ stands for ‘Amphibious Transport’ and ‘D’ for ‘Dock’, hence LPD. In 
British use LPD has come to mean ‘Landing Platform Dock’ based on an initial misunderstanding 
of the US abbreviation. This is intriguing given that the description of these ships in all of the 
preliminary studies was as Amphibious Transport Docks, an accurate translation of LPD. I am 
indebted to Professor Eric Grove for clarification on this point.
64 NA DEFE 5/87, COS (58) 296, 32 Dec 1958. NA DEFE 4/115, COS (59) 1st Meeting, item 
10, 1 Jan. 1959.
65 NA DEFE 5/103, COS (60) 151, report by the Shipping Resources Committee, 31 May 1961.
66 Sir	Galahad, commissioned in 1966, was badly damaged by an Argentine air attack in Jun. 
1982. The vessel was replaced by a ship of the same name that commissioned in 1987. 
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refined this concept in their post-war LSDs and with the new Raleigh	class LPDs, 
the first of which commissioned in 1962. Nevertheless, the two British LPDs did 
help to transform British capabilities providing, with the commando carrier and the 
LSLs, a robust modern force well suited to the unpredictable demands of British 
policy. Both ships had eventful careers, providing service from the warm waters of 
the Indian Ocean to the freezing seas off northern Norway and both played a key 
role in support of the amphibious operations that made possible the liberation of the 
Falklands Islands in 1982. They were finally decommissioned in 1999 (Intrepid)	and 
2002 (Fearless), their versatility having provided ample validation of the decision to 
adopt the ATD type design. 
Fearless and Intrepid were built to support a new emphasis within British 
defence policy on expeditionary forces designed to provide flexible options for 
military intervention overseas, particularly east of Suez. The Royal Navy embraced 
the expeditionary role and by 1962 amphibious operations had become their key 
task, with all other assets justified through reference to it. Of course, the role was 
particularly useful because it allowed them to advance a case for a balanced fleet, a 
fleet not too dissimilar to the one that they would have wanted whether or not the 
amphibious role was so prominent. A key element of this was the plan to replace the 
existing aircraft carriers with new, larger and more capable vessels by the 1970s. In 
this respect the navy ran into intense opposition from the RAF, who were adamantly 
opposed to anything that might challenge their primacy in the provision of air power 
overseas. However, whilst their opposition to the carrier replacement programme 
was total, the RAF did not show the same hostility to plans for new amphibious 
ships. Indeed, even as the carrier controversy gained pace, the Chief of the Air Staff, 
Air Marshal Sir Thomas Pike, suggested in 1961 that the navy might accept a smaller 
‘close support carrier’, soon dubbed the Pike-ship, that would combine the role of 
commando carrier and light aircraft carrier.67 The suggestion was motivated more 
by a desire to push the navy away from the large carriers that they favoured than by 
any inherent belief in the value of amphibious forces, and it should be noted that the 
commando carriers provided a similar type of capability for small scale intervention 
by light forces that was favoured by the Air Force. Nevertheless, the Pike-ship 
concept, and subsequent RAF interest in a similar proposal by Minister of Defence 
Peter Thorneycroft two years later (dubbed the Thorneycraft) does illustrate 
a willingness to countenance further enhancements to the navy’s amphibious 
capabilities once these were not linked overtly to support for new large carriers.68 It 
is significant that the debate over the replacement of amphibious shipping occurred 
in the late 1950s before the carrier controversy really ignited. The ships supported 
a concept of operations at odds with that preferred by the RAF and for which the 
RAF consistently argued against, but the army and the navy were united in thinking 
these ships necessary and they were supported in this by the Minister of Defence. 
By the time that Fearless	and Intrepid	were operational the role for which they 
had been built had begun to disappear as the British withdrew from east of Suez. 
However, and unlike the ill-fated new carrier, they were already built and represented 
a considerable investment of capital and thus they survived the cuts of the Labour 
67 NA AIR 8/2328, COS (61) 358, 29 Sep. 1961.
68 See NA DEFE 4/52, COS 16 mtg/63, 26 Feb. 1963; NA ADM 205/194; NA AIR 20/11423 
and NA AIR 8/2354.
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Chancellor, Denis Healey, finding a new role in colder waters closer to home. In 
the event the change in British policy meant that the ability to land heavy armour 
in an assault did not figure prominently in the careers of these two ships. However, 
the inherent flexibility built into their design by the need to meet this requirement 
served them well in a wide variety of different circumstances and it is significant that 
their replacements, two 18,500 ton Albion class LPDs, follow broadly similar design 
principles. In retrospect it appears that the navy, with army support, did a good job 
when replacing the AW Squadron.
Appendix A
Figures 1 to 7 show the sketch designs for the different ship types considered in the 
report on the Technical Examination of the Problem of Replacement of the Assault 
Lift by the Admiralty Assault Study Group, 13 November 1958.69 The report 
concluded that the best choice appeared to be either BL/D (figure 5) or DL/B (figure 
7) and ultimately the latter provided the basis for future planning. 
69 NA DEFE 5/86, COS (58) 254, 13 Nov. 1958.
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